Personnel/Human Resources Management: A Political Influence Perspective

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It was suggested over 10 years ago that new and different perspectives should be applied to the Personnel/Human Resources Management (P/HRM) field in an effort to promote theory and research and expand our understanding of the dynamics underlying P/HRM processes. This article tries to address this suggestion in three ways. First, it proposes a political influence perspective as an alternative way to view P/HRM decisions and actions. Second, it reviews research investigating political influence in key P/HRM areas. Third, it examines the strengths and limitations of the political influence perspective relative to other perspectives.

The field of Personnel/Human Resources Management (P/HRM) has evolved, over the years, from a largely record-keeping, maintenance function to one of generally acknowledged strategic importance to the organization (e.g., Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991; Rowland & Ferris, 1982). Furthermore, from a research standpoint, P/HRM has advanced from a primarily atheoretical, “problem-driven” discipline (i.e., research generated by the need to solve real-world problems or address issues of major importance to the practice of P/HRM), to one actively concerned with both theoretical and methodological development. Over 10 years ago, Ferris (1980) called for alternative theoretical and methodological perspectives on P/HRM efforts to advance our understanding and promote theory and research. In recent years, a number of different perspectives have been taken in the P/HRM field, including economic/utility and international, as well as the more macro-level organization theory and strategy perspectives. Some of these perspectives have been examined and reflected in previous Yearly Review articles (Fisher, 1989; Mahoney & Deckop, 1986).

This Yearly Review article has several purposes. One is to introduce a political
influence perspective as an alternative way of viewing P/HRM. A second objective is to review political influence research. Finally, the political influence perspective is critically evaluated and fruitful avenues for future research are suggested.

**Perspectives on P/HRM**

The field of P/HRM has been viewed from a number of disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, though not all have received equal attention. It is fair to state that P/HRM has been dominated by the disciplines of psychology and economics with respect to both theory and methodology. The particularly strong influence of psychology likely explains why P/HRM theory and research traditionally have been quite micro-analytic, focusing on the individual level of analysis. Sociological theory and method also have been brought to bear on the investigation of P/HRM issues, however, to a previously lesser (but now growing) extent.

Recently, a number of additional perspectives, which draw from several disciplines, have emerged and begun to receive considerable attention. One is the strategic perspective, which casts the P/HRM function in a long-term, integrative view, with strong linkages to business strategy (e.g., Butler et al., 1991). Another is the international perspective, which has recognized the importance of cross-cultural considerations in P/HRM practices as organizations increasingly are competing in a global economy (e.g., Dowling & Schuler, 1990). Finally, out of the disciplines of psychology and economics have emerged two other perspectives that have been applied to P/HRM issues: information processing (Motowidlo, 1986) and utility analysis (Boudreau, 1988).

Indeed, a number of different perspectives have been applied to P/HRM in recent years, and each one raises some different issues and considerations. However, when more careful examination is made of the fundamental underlying assumptions of these different perspectives, one can see that a common theme emerges. All perspectives adopt a "rational model" of organizations, and activities within those organizations. Bolman and Deal (1991) have examined organizations from several perspectives or "frames," one of which is the human resource frame. The human resource frame, fundamentally, focuses on the fit between individuals and organizations. Furthermore, critical concepts involved in P/HRM practices, such as individual performance, competence, and effectiveness, are considered objective realities that are knowable and amenable to measurement (albeit, imprecise).

The rationality of the human resource frame or perspective has been the implicit assumption of virtually all of the theory and research in P/HRM, and it has remained largely unquestioned to date. Despite its obvious contributions, this perspective has been criticized recently as being naive (Bolman & Deal, 1991). More specifically, the human resource perspective has been viewed as overly optimistic about the possibility of maximizing individual and organizational needs, and underplaying (or even ignoring) the issues of competing interests, power, and politics. Such criticisms raise the questions of whether a political perspective can contribute meaningfully to our understanding of P/HRM.
Political Influence Perspective

Definitions of Politics in Organizations

Organizational scientists have developed different notions of what constitutes political behavior, and these notions have come from a number of different disciplines. Some have defined politics in terms of the behavior of the interest groups to use power to influence decision making (Pettigrew, 1973; Tushman, 1977), or through coalition building and bargaining (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). Others have focused on the self-serving and organizationally nonsanctioned nature of individual behavior in organizations (e.g., Burns, 1961; Farrell & Peterson, 1982; Ganz & Murray, 1980; Mayes & Allen, 1977; Porter, 1976; Schein, 1977). Still others have characterized organizational politics as a social influence process with potentially functional or dysfunctional organizational consequences (Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1979; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989b; Porter, Allen, & Angle, 1981), or simply the management of influence (Madison, Allen, Porter, Renwick, & Mayes, 1980). Although subscribing to aspects of several of these definitions, Pfeffer (1981b) more directly established the linkage between politics and power, and conceived of organizational politics as “the study of power in action” (7). Mintzberg (1983) referred to politics as “individual or group behavior that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, and above all, in the technical sense, illegitimate — sanctioned neither by formal authority, accepted ideology, nor certified expertise (though it may exploit any one of these)” (172).

Yet other views of political influence have adopted a decidedly more social psychological perspective, and have conceptualized such influence as impression management, often isolating on the particular tactic of ingratiation (e.g., Gardner & Martin, 1988; Jones, 1964; Liden & Mitchell, 1988; Ralston, 1985; Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). Schlenker (1980), a leading impression management theorist, has defined impression management as “the conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions” (6). Whereas the foregoing do not exhaust all possible definitions of political influence, they provide a representative sample.

The Proposed Perspective on Political Influence

In order to provide some integration and closure regarding the foregoing views on politics, it might be useful to examine basic assumptions of political perspectives. The political perspective fundamentally assumes that power and politics are facts of life in organizations, and thus, are not issues that can be dispensed with easily or ignored (Bolman & Deal, 1991). Furthermore, it assumes that organizations are composed of varied individuals and coalitions with diverse interests, and that decisions in organizations emerge from processes of interpersonal influence, typically involving the allocation of scarce resources.

Related to the political perspective, but distinctive in its own right is the symbolic frame. In contrast to views that emphasize organizational reality and objectivity, the symbolic frame concerns itself with the ambiguity and meaning of phenomena in organizations (Bolman & Deal, 1991). This frame assumes that the
complexity and ambiguity inherent in organizations is acted upon by individuals who create and manipulate symbols for purposes of establishing meaning. The symbolic frame, then, portrays organizations quite differently than more traditional perspectives that emphasize (or at least assume) rationality and certainty. Yet, it shares in common with the political perspective a basic concern with influence for the purpose of establishing agreement.

Returning now to the numerous definitions of organizational politics presented at the beginning of this section, we can propose an integration of these views. Indeed, there are some differences across the various definitions, but we would suggest they are relatively minor ones, primarily reflecting differences in disciplinary background and level of analysis. Particularly noteworthy is the convergence of the definitions on the notion of influence, although the specific manifestation of influence attempts is likely to differ somewhat across the various views. Mindful of these earlier definitional efforts and their convergence, we have developed a conceptualization of political influence that is derived from an integration of the political and symbolic perspectives on organizational life and is useful for the examination of P/HRM decisions and activities (Ferris, King, Judge, & Kacmar, 1991). Quite simply, we construe political influence as the management of shared meaning by individuals, groups, or organizations. Rather than inherent properties of situations, meanings are the result of our responses to those situations and our subsequent interpretations. Whether more or less, we all have a say in the interpretations of those events and some consensus forms, usually legitimized by organizational symbols and myths. These “shared meanings” then provide guidelines for future interpretations and organizational behavior. The idea is to manage the meaning of the situation to produce the outcomes desired.

All behavior is not political because the emphasis is on deliberate attempts to control the shared meanings of phenomena. This omits non-deliberate behavior such as routine or mindless activity and types of deliberate behavior that are not specifically geared toward creating, maintaining, or altering shared meanings. Characterizing political influence as deliberate attempts to manage or control the meanings shared by others provides an interesting opportunity to examine how employees in organizations, as well as job applicants, use this process to influence key human resource decisions. This characterization is somewhat similar to the “managed thought” notion proposed by Chatman, Bell, and Staw (1986) in their discussion of the role of impression management in organizations.

Furthermore, we believe this conception of political influence is particularly functional for two additional reasons. One is that unlike the “rational model” assumptions of more traditional perspectives, this conception does not assume that evaluative dimensions, such as competence, performance, and fit, are necessarily objective realities. Instead, they might well represent realities that are socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), crafted skillfully through the management of shared meaning processes.

A second benefit we see is that this perspective, to the greatest extent possible, attempts to portray political influence as a value-neutral process, which is neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but is a pervasive feature of organizations due to the diversity of interests and scarcity of resources. We feel this is an important
point because it is fair to state that the concept of organizational politics traditionally has been viewed in a largely pejorative sense, and it is this negative connotation that has limited efforts to study and better understand this concept.

A final point about the political influence perspective and its application to the field of P/HRM is that though the type of inclusive, systematic analysis undertaken in this paper begins to break some new ground, the notion of influence in P/HRM decisions and activities has been raised by others before. Theoretical developments have been proposed on social influence components and their role in P/HRM (Ferris & Mitchell, 1987; Northcraft, Neale, & Huber, 1988), with political influence perhaps appropriately construed as a special case of social influence. More recently, several authors, representing different disciplinary backgrounds, have discussed political influence in the context of particular P/HRM decisions and processes (Ferris, Fedor, Chachere, & Pondy, 1989; Ferris & King, in press; Frost, 1989; Pfeffer, 1989).

Purpose of this Article

The overarching objective in writing this article is to propose and evaluate the usefulness of a political influence perspective in P/HRM. In the pursuit of this overarching objective, research is reviewed that is conducted at different levels of analysis. First, research is reviewed at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis, which not unexpectedly represents the vast majority of studies that have investigated political influence in P/HRM. Then, the context is broadened to consider group- and organization-level research in order to more completely understand the larger contextual effects of political influence as they bear upon P/HRM systems and decisions and to make better sense of the interpersonal dynamics that materialize at individual and dyadic levels of analysis.

A point about inclusiveness needs to be made before beginning. The title of this article implies that a political influence perspective will be applied to the entire field of P/HRM, comprehensively addressing all areas. That is a lot of ground to cover in an article with finite limitations on length, so we made some decisions concerning the restrictiveness of this investigation. This review and analysis focuses on staffing, evaluation, and rewards, which reflect what we (and many others), believe to be the key P/HRM system and decision areas, involving the allocation of scarce resources. By omitting areas such as training and development, we are not implying that political influence does not apply here. In fact, we can envision the emergence of political influence dynamics in decisions made about human resource development. Thus, whereas we make no claim of comprehensiveness in our review and analysis of P/HRM, we do, in fact, make a claim of representativeness of coverage.

Political Influence in P/HRM at the Individual and Dyadic Levels of Analysis

The analysis and review of political influence as it bears upon key P/HRM decisions and actions is somewhat problematic if we confine our investigation exclusively to theory and research reflective of, and published in, the P/HRM field per se (i.e., assuming a specific and rigid definition of P/HRM). However, we be-
lieve that much can be learned about P/HRM from the examination of work done in organizational behavior and social psychology. Furthermore, we believe that the boundaries between P/HRM and organizational behavior are not clearly drawn and sharply focused, but rather are blurred and permeable. Some would likely perceive this as a limitation of the field; we see it as a strength. Therefore, we adopt here a working notion of the P/HRM field sufficiently broad to allow for the inclusion of theory and research that typically would be classified into fields traditionally considered outside of P/HRM. In so doing, it is our belief that a richer and more informed understanding of the political influence perspective in P/HRM will result.

Organizing Framework

The research on political influence in P/HRM at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis appears to be most conveniently organized according to the framework presented in Figure 1. The framework essentially proposes that political influence behavior is a function of both situational characteristics and the characteristics of the actor and the target. Political influence behavior, in turn, is believed to affect P/HRM decisions and actions (e.g., personnel selection, performance evaluation, etc.) through its effects on several potential mediating variables. One notion is that political behavior leads to liking; another is that such behavior results in cognitive assessments of competence; and a third possibility is that political behavior contributes to an evaluation that the actor "fits" the situation, driven by perceived or actual similarity with some standard of comparison (e.g., the target’s own characteristics, the values and culture of the organization, etc.). Finally, P/HRM decisions and actions have consequences, presumably both attitudinal and behavioral.

Figure 1. Political influence in P/HRM at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis.
The model presented in Figure 1 serves as the organizing framework for political influence theory and research at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis, as noted in the following sections of this review.

**Situational Characteristics**

Political influence, like any other behavior in organizations, does not operate in a vacuum. The use of influence tactics is undoubtedly enhanced by some aspects of the environment and suppressed by others. Past theoretical efforts and empirical findings have suggested the existence of several environmental antecedents to political influence behavior.

**Ambiguity.** Several have suggested that political influence behavior is more apt to occur in environments or situations characterized by a high degree of ambiguity (e.g., Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989; Porter et al., 1981; Ralston, 1985). One way to define ambiguity is the absence of information. When ambiguity is high, the individual may have few clues with which to direct their behavior. When the situation is ambiguous — meaning that clear evaluation criteria do not exist — reliance is often placed on subjective criteria for personnel decisions. Given Mintzberg’s (1983) reference to the informal nature of political behavior, ambiguous environments with reliance on subjective evaluations is an environment in which the use of political influence tactics is likely to flourish. For example, Gilmore and Ferris (1989a, 1989b), discussing ambiguity in the context of the employment interview, offered the interesting proposition that inexperienced interviewers with little information about the job provide a receptive forum for applicant influence behaviors.

The importance of ambiguity on the use of influence tactics has been reinforced by the findings from several studies. For example, Fandt and Ferris (1990) found that ambiguity coupled with accountability led to greater management of information by individuals.

**Accountability.** The stipulation that people answer for their actions clearly can exercise substantial impact on their behavior in such situations, including political influence behavior. Tetlock (1985) has extensively examined accountability in decision contexts and has provided some interesting insights. He suggested the “acceptability heuristic” as the simplest way of coping with accountability, which involves taking actions that are believed to be acceptable to influential others to whom one must answer or report. Such behaviors could quite appropriately be classified as political influence because the intention is to manage shared meaning for purposes of gaining approval and material reward (e.g., promotions).

Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982) found that those having the most responsibility were more likely to manage impressions. In a sense, these individuals have the most to lose (in terms of their position of power) by not managing impressions. Further, Pfeffer (1981a) argued that one way for high position holders to add to their power base and perceived image is to present favorable impressions. Fandt and Ferris (1990) found that accountability interacted with ambiguity in the management of impressions. Those in conditions of high accountability and low ambiguity manipulated information more.

**Instrumentality.** Several authors have examined political influence behavior
with respect to its instrumentality or expected utility (e.g., Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989; Porter et al., 1981). Those individuals perceiving an environment rewarding the use of influence tactics are more inclined to use such tactics. Conversely, those seeing little or even negative reinforcements for influence behavior may understandably be reluctant to use them. Janson and Von Glinow (1985) corroborated this when they suggested that political influence behavior is most likely to occur when rewarded by the organization and that many organizations do just that. Furthermore, Cheng (1983) demonstrated that individuals respond to a negative organizational environment (i.e., characterized by what might be considered political behavior) by themselves behaving politically. Such a reaction might result from individuals’ interpretation that such behavior is socially acceptable in this context.

The nature of the environment in reinforcing political behavior, in addition to shaping the use of influence tactics, may also affect the way individuals perceive their environment. Those who perceive the organizational environment as hostile to the use of influence tactics may see political behavior as threats to their careers. On the other hand, individuals perceiving influence behavior as a means to enhance their career are more likely to see influence as an opportunity. Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) argued that these perceptions, in turn, are likely to affect the individual’s behavior (e.g., withdrawal) in the organization.

As suggested by Ferris, Russ and Fandt (1989), the perceptions of the instrumentality of influence behavior, or whether political influence is likely to be seen as an opportunity or threat, probably is molded by how the supervisor’s influence behavior is reinforced. Research by Weiss (1977, 1978) suggests that employees often model the work values and management styles of their supervisors. Given this, it stands to reason that when the supervisors’ political influence behavior is instrumental in achieving valued outcomes, such behavior is more likely to occur.

Spatial distance. Ferris, Judge, Rowland, and Fitzgibbons (1991) proposed that one of the more important situational determinants of influence behaviors may be spatial distance, or the proximity in which subordinates work with their supervisors. They hypothesized that the effect of spatial distance is likely to depend on the type of influence tactic employed. For tactics oriented toward the job (e.g., covering up a negative event), distance between the supervisor and subordinate was thought to allow greater opportunity to enact job-focused tactics beyond the watchful eye of the supervisor. However, tactics oriented toward the supervisor (e.g., volunteering to help the supervisor with his or her tasks) obviously require the supervisor’s presence. Therefore, decreased spatial distance was thought to promote the use of supervisor-focused influence tactics. Ferris, Judge, Rowland, and Fitzgibbons found that spatial distance did result in significantly greater use of supervisor-focused tactics, but no significant decrease in the use of job-focused tactics.

Another recent investigation examined the roles of spatial distance and political influence behavior in age discrimination. Ferris and King (in press) proposed and tested a model of age discrimination in performance evaluation that characterized older employees in an unfair competition for performance ratings affected by political influence behavior and affect. Older employees tended to occupy jobs
that placed them in more distant physical proximity to their supervisors, which hindered political influence attempts and subsequent performance ratings. More careful consideration of the spatial distance construct is needed relative to the role it plays in political influence conceptualizations.

**Actor and Target Characteristics**

In addition to situational characteristics, political influence behavior is affected by the personal characteristics of both the actor/influencer and the target of the influence attempt. A variety of characteristics have been investigated, but only those that have specific relevance to P/HRM issues are reviewed.

**Self-monitoring.** Those who possess the desire to manage impressions will undoubtedly require the ability to control their own behavior to be successful. Self-monitoring is a personality construct that concerns exactly this — the ability of individuals to monitor and control their behavior (Snyder, 1987). The individual high on self-monitoring is one who can carefully scan the environment for social cues and modify his or her behavior accordingly. This is obviously an important skill to the implementation of influence tactics.

Self-monitoring has received some empirical attention. Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982), investigating situations in which decision-makers were faced with failure found that self-monitoring significantly predicted the extent to which they engaged in opportunistic behaviors. Von Baeyer, Shirik, and Zanna (1981) found that self-monitoring predicted impression management tactics by applicants in the context of the interview. Finally, Fandt and Ferris’ (1990) results indicated that self-monitoring significantly predicted the use of information manipulation, particularly when accountability was high.

**Machiavellianism.** Machiavellians (Machs), after their namesake, are individuals who will do most anything to enhance their self-interests, including manipulation, lying, and exploiting the misfortunes of others (Christie & Geis, 1970). These behaviors obviously represent the dark side of influence behavior. Research supports that high Machs are more likely to manage impressions of others (Kauffman & Steiner, 1968; Pandey, 1981; Pandey & Rastogi, 1979). Touhey (1973) has argued that Machiavellianism allows goal attainment only to those skillful enough to conceal their underlying motives. Perhaps supporting this hypothesis are results by Ferris, Judge, Rowland, and Fitzgibbons (1991) that found that subtle behaviors such as volunteering to help the supervisor led to higher performance ratings and resource provision, whereas more obvious behaviors, such as making the supervisor aware of one’s accomplishments, led to lower performance ratings and resource provision. The skillful gamesperson is able to make a distinction between those likely to be effective and those likely to backfire. Further, it appears that the supervisor is able to make this distinction as well.

**Gender.** It is clear that women traditionally have operated from inferior power positions in most organizations (Kanter, 1977; Lips, 1981). Ragins and Sundstrom (1989) found that men consistently had greater access to resources for power (e.g., peer networks, mentors) than did women. How this power difference operates on the use of influence tactics is unclear. It may be that women, because they are typically in a weaker position of power, are more motivated to gain
power and use influence tactics to this end. Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) argued that because of these very power reasons women are more likely to see their work environment as political. Although the relationship between politics perceptions and political behavior is unclear, it would be unusual for an individual to behave politically in an environment they perceived as completely apolitical.

There is some empirical evidence regarding gender effects on influence behavior. Von Baeyer et al. (1981) found that women presented themselves in a more feminine manner when the interviewer possessed such stereotypes about women ("women should be passive, attractive, not independent, make coffee"). On the other hand, Dipboye and Wiley (1977) found that moderately aggressive female applicants were rated as favorably as moderately aggressive males, and that passive males and females were rated equally negatively by college recruiters. From the perspective of the evaluator, two studies have shown that there is a self-matching bias in performance ratings. Surprisingly, however, both studies found that managers rated same sex subordinates lower than opposite sex subordinates (Israei, 1987; Rose & Stone, 1978).

In their conception of social influence in human resources research, Ferris and Mitchell (1987) discussed potential gender differences in influenceability. Their analysis suggested that females tended to be more susceptible to influence attempts than males. Obviously, this is a generalized finding and needs to be examined more explicitly within the context of political influence in P/HRM decisions and actions.

**Political Influence Behavior**

Particular types of political influence behaviors have been identified and investigated by a number of researchers. Much attention has been devoted to the influence tactic of ingratiation (Jones, 1964; Liden & Mitchell, 1988; Ralston, 1985; Wortman & Linsenmeier, 1977). Other conceptual and empirical identification efforts have focused on a broader set of political influence behaviors. The simplest of these classification schemes was developed by Porter et al. (1981), who proposed two categories of behaviors (i.e., Sanctions and Informational) with specific tactics listed under each. According to Porter et al., Sanctions are less relevant to upward political influence attempts, which is the exclusive focus of their theory. Their Informational category included persuasion, manipulative persuasion, and manipulation, which vary on the extent to which both the intent of the behavior and the nature of the influence attempt are known by the target.

The classifications of political influence behaviors that have had the greatest impact on the field have emerged from the programmatic work of three notable behavioral scientists: Edward Jones, David Kipnis, and James Tedeschi. Jones generated a theory of strategic self-presentation in which he proposed a taxonomy of five influence behaviors (Jones & Pittman, 1982). These five self-presentation behaviors are ingratiation, intimidation, self-promotion, exemplification, and supplication.

Kipnis, whose work has stimulated the most influence research in the organizational sciences, inductively generated eight political influence tactics: assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality, sanctions, exchange, upward appeal, blocking, and
coalitions (Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980). Whereas, many earlier efforts focused on unidirectional political influence (i.e., typically upward influence), Kipnis’ tactics were sufficiently broad to encompass upward, lateral, and downward influence attempts. Furthermore, Kipnis’ classification scheme has not only been used in many empirical studies examining influence effects, but it has prompted recent careful scrutiny of his dimensions (Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990; Yukl & Falbe, 1990).

With regard to political influence behavior in P/HRM decisions and actions, Tedeschi’s categorization scheme provides a convenient vehicle for examination (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). This scheme crosses two binary dimensions to create a four-cell taxonomy of political influence behaviors. The behaviors can be either assertive or defensive in nature, and tactical (short-term) or strategic (long-term). More attention is devoted here to tactical-assertive behaviors, because they have been most extensively examined in P/HRM research. However, the other three quadrants are mentioned briefly first.

Strategic-assertive influence behaviors include efforts to enhance prestige, status, credibility, and trustworthiness, and (we might add) reputation. These are qualities that take time to develop and thus necessarily need to be worked on over time. This category of behaviors would seem to fit well in longitudinal research investigations of career progress.

Strategic-defensive behaviors involve such behaviors as alcoholism, drug abuse, and learned helplessness, and thus seem less relevant to the present perspective.

Perhaps the best known tactical-assertive tactic is ingratiating. Ingratiation can take a number of forms such as favor doing, flattery, opinion conformity (i.e., expressing opinions similar to a focal other), or subservient behavior (the “utility of humility”). Other types of assertive tactics involve self-promotion, or the act of bringing to light one’s personal accomplishments, characteristics, or qualities in order to present oneself in the most favorable manner. Self-promotion can take at least two different forms, materializing as entitlements or enhancements. Entitlements involve verbal claims of responsibility for positive events or outcomes that have occurred, even when one cannot rightfully be credited with such outcomes. Enhancements refer to attempts to exaggerate or make more of one’s accomplishments than is justified. Thus, the category of assertive influence tactics involves proactive efforts to manipulate or manage images conveyed to important others and, consequently, to manage shared meanings.

The other category of influence behaviors is tactical-defensive tactics and refers to more reactive attempts to circumvent negative outcomes. For example, in situations of poor performance, employees may use tactics such as apologies, excuses, justifications, or disclaimers in order to prevent negative consequences (e.g., Wood & Mitchell, 1981).

Taken together, these two categories of influence tactics provide some indication of the nature of political influence tactics in organizations and the diversified portfolio of techniques that are brought to bear upon human resource systems and decisions. Furthermore, not all influence behaviors are similarly perceived or equally effective, as will be seen in the subsequent review of empirical research.
P/HRM Decisions and Actions

The previous three sections have presented the conditions under which political influence behaviors are most likely to occur and be effective, and the specific forms political influence can take. This section of the review examines consequences of political influence in terms of specific P/HRM decisions and actions. An examination is also made here of the processes depicted in Figure 1 that mediate between political influence behavior and P/HRM decisions and actions.

As mentioned earlier, our review and analysis of political influence is not exhaustive in its investigation of P/HRM areas. Instead, the intent is to examine representatively key P/HRM system areas of staffing, evaluation, and rewards. The specific P/HRM decision/action areas included here are personnel selection, performance evaluation, promotion and career mobility, and compensation.

Personnel selection: Job applicant behavior. The personnel selection context provides an interesting opportunity to examine political influence because it represents a situation typically characterized by a considerable degree of ambiguity. Whereas the model presented in Figure 1 flexibly allows for either the job applicant or the decision maker to engage in political influence behavior in this context, most of the research to date has investigated applicant behavior. Furthermore, it is quite conceivable that political influence behavior can be demonstrated in different types of personnel selection practices, but virtually all of the research has investigated the employment interview. These two constraints, therefore, will focus the present review and analysis toward political influence behaviors of applicants in the employment interview. However, a subsequent section of this article indicates a need to consider other selection practices, such as letters of recommendation (Knouse, 1989).

Practitioners in the personnel selection area have long recognized that there is a strong incentive on the part of applicants to actively manage the impressions that selection decision makers form of them. It has been a relatively recent development, however, that researchers investigating selection decisions, particularly the interview, have systematically examined the effect of impression management on selection decisions. Some theoretical works have appeared on the role of impression management in the selection process. For example, Jones and Pittman (1982) and Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) developed taxonomies regarding specific types of behaviors that applicants engage in to manage impressions in the interview. Tedeschi and Melburg distinguished between assertive (positively projecting a strong image) and defensive (excuse-making and rationalization) influence behaviors. The authors further distinguished between tactical (short-term) and strategic (long-term) focused behaviors. One assertive strategic behavior that has received considerable empirical support is the effect of physical attractiveness (including grooming and attire) on interviewer decisions (Beehr & Gilmore, 1982; Cash, 1985; Dipboye, Arvey, & Terpstra, 1977; Forsythe, Drake, & Cox, 1985; Gilmore, Beehr, & Love, 1986). Gilmore and Ferris (1989b) provided an overview of research on this and the other dimensions of Tedeschi and Melburg's taxonomy as applied to the employment interview.

It is clear that, in general, political influence by applicants influences interviewer judgments. Virtually every study that has examined political influence in
the interview has found an effect. In fact, in a recent study, impression management techniques were found to have a much more powerful effect on interviewer judgments than objective qualifications (Gilmore & Ferris, 1989a).

What may be more important to explore is that different types and amounts of influence tactics appear to lead to different outcomes. Baron (1989) recognized this when he argued there is a "too much of a good thing" effect in terms of applicant influence strategies. Although the use of impression management may lead to higher evaluations, there is a point at which there is overkill. For example, Baron (1986, 1989) found that both pleasant scent and being well dressed improved interview judgments when used alone, but when used together led to lower evaluations than casual attire and no scent. Baron's empirical findings are consistent with what common sense would tell us. For example, smiling and eye contact has been found to lead to higher interviewer evaluations of job candidates (Forbes & Jackson, 1980; Imada & Hakel, 1977). However, those individuals that never cease to smile or continually stare at the interviewer would obviously not be highly evaluated.

Interestingly, it appears that, in general, controlling types of influence tactics (dominance, self-promotion, etc.) lead to job applicants being more successful in the interview than applicants who engage in more submissive or passive influence tactics (Dipboye & Wiley, 1977, 1978; Kacmar, Delery, & Ferris, 1990; Tullar, 1989). This runs contrary to conventional wisdom, which urges being deferential and tractable to the interviewer. On the contrary, it appears that those who "toot their own horn" are the ones that get ahead in the interview, perhaps due to the expectations in this context.

**Personnel selection: Decision-maker behavior.** Up to this point, we have dealt only with the applicant side of political influence behavior. However, it is important to note that the selection decision maker may also be motivated to employ, and in fact actively use, influence tactics. As indicated earlier, Gilmore and Ferris (1989b) have argued that managers may prefer individuals similar to themselves. The motive behind this may be political. Perhaps managers like individuals similar to themselves because this allows them to build coalitions and contribute to their own power base. Although this does not imply that managers will actually use influence tactics in the selection process, it does suggest that political motives may underlie selection decisions. Wanous (1989) reviewed several studies that found what recruiters say, and how they say it, is important in determining whether the applicant accepts or rejects an offer. The fact that the organizational impressions that interviewers projected consistently influenced applicants' job choices provides a strong incentive for recruiters and interviewers to use impression management techniques. However, future research needs to address the extent to which interviewers actually manage impressions.

**Personnel selection: Managing fit.** A process believed to mediate between political influence behavior and P/HRM decisions is the "fit" of the candidate, which typically implies the perceived or actual similarity to some standard. The evaluative standard used frequently involves the characteristics of the decision makers themselves.

Indeed, managing the perceived similarity between the interviewer and appli-
cant appears to be an important and useful tactic. Basket (1973), Frank and Hackman (1973), and Schmitt (1976) all reported that similarity between interviewer and interviewee favorably affected interviewer evaluation of the applicant. Applicant strategies such as agreeing with comments made by the interviewer to promote perceived similarity do seem to improve interviewer evaluations of the applicant. An interesting example of how this similarity process operates is found in the previously cited work of von Baeyer et al. (1981). They found that female applicants attempted to present themselves in a more feminine manner when they knew the interviewer held traditional stereotypes of women. Thus, managing similarity may extend to matching oneself to particular stereotypes.

The relationship of perceived similarity and decision-maker evaluations in the employment interview is thus a notable one, but may well extend beyond decision-maker characteristics as the reference point or standard. Perhaps one of the more important goals of those using influence tactics in the selection process is to increase the evaluator's perception of the fit between the applicant and organization. In concept, this transcends similarity between the interviewer and interviewee to involve similarity between the applicant and the organization's culture. It may be the specific influence tactics used depend on the situation, but the overall goal of enhancing the perception of congruence between the characteristics one has to offer and what the organization values remains the same. Therefore, the notion of fit may hold the promise of explaining how and why individuals seek to manage impressions in the interview and the extent to which they are effective in doing so.

Most writings of fit have been plagued by imprecision, emphasizing nebulous terms such as "right types" (Klimoski & Strickland, 1977; Schneider, 1987). Rynes and Gerhart (1990) have argued that such notions add little to the understanding of fit. Although it may be nebulous by nature, fit is perhaps best understood as the degree to which the characteristics (dispositional and demographic traits, values and goals) of the applicant or employee match those of employees considered successful in the organization. Because most interviewers probably consider themselves successful employees, this may actually translate into how closely the applicant resembles the interviewer(s).

The inclusion of fit as a criterion in the selection process may relate to organizational strategy. By selecting individuals consistent with overall business strategies, organizational performance may be enhanced. Writers in the strategy area have argued this to be the case (Gupta, 1986; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Szilagyi & Schweiger, 1984). A way to implement strategy is by designing an organization's culture to enhance strategic objectives (Butler et al., 1991). Firms may select employees who manifestly fit the existing culture. Schein (1990) contended that culture is perpetuated by the selection of new employees who already have the "right" set of beliefs and values. Similarly, others have contended that in order for a corporate culture to flourish, it is important that applicants fit into the existing value system of the organization (Fombrun, 1983).

Research has demonstrated that the extent to which an applicant is perceived to fit the job, culture, or organization substantially increases the applicant's likelihood of receiving a job offer (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990). Fit may be inherently
vague, which allows it to take a number of forms and permits applicants to play upon this ambiguity and exercise a greater degree of influence over the selection process and outcomes. For example, fit has been viewed as attitude similarity between applicant and interviewer/evaluator, and such perceived similarity in attitudes has been associated with more favorable evaluations (e.g., decisions to hire) of job applicants (e.g., Peters & Terborg, 1975; Schmitt, 1976).

Fit also may be related to appearance, personality, and values, and the extent to which each of these is consistent with some expected or desired level. Molloy (1975) elevated appearance and dress to a higher level in the role it is believed to play in interpersonal evaluations including personnel selection decisions. Recent research has shown that appearance affects interviewer judgments (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990).

The research on fit reviewed earlier suggested that assessments of fit typically have focused on the personality of the applicant. Organizations certainly differ in their strategic mission. Because differing strategic missions may require individuals possessing particular personality traits, it seems reasonable to expect that overall personality composition of employees significantly differs by organization. As mentioned earlier, several writers in the strategy literature have emphasized that the match between the characteristics of the individual and the strategic characteristics of the organization are of central importance in determining organizational success.

For example, an organization that has typically pursued an aggressive business strategy may be more likely to have aggressive employees. If so, the organization may seek to hire aggressive employees in the future. If the applicant perceives the personality desired, he or she might seek to manage the way in which his or her personality is perceived. If the interviewer, for example, presents the impression that cohesiveness and cooperation is very important to the organization, the applicant may take particular care not to appear aggressive or stubborn.

It may be that personality of the interviewer alone is the dominant effect. The applicant may not be aware of the personality of the other organization members, only the interviewer's. If the interviewer displays certain attributes, the applicant may seek to match the actions that manifest the traits. The interviewer displaying certain actions makes it more likely that the applicant will act in a reciprocal fashion. Thus, in such cases, the applicant has effectively managed the shared meaning of personality similarity and the interviewer may well recommend hiring due to perceived fit to the job (when it is actually perceived similarity to himself or herself). Research on personality and fit has shown that job applicants who possess personality characteristics congruent with the job for which they are being evaluated tend to be judged as more suitable for that job (Paunonen, Jackson, & Oberman, 1987).

Performance evaluation: Subordinate behavior. Another very important P/HRM activity is performance evaluation. Despite the traditional assumption that performance evaluation operates in a quite systematic and rational way, leading to accurate and reliable assessments of "true" performance, this process and its corresponding outcomes are susceptible to considerable influence from non-performance factors and deliberate manipulations by both evaluators and evalua-
tees. Ferris, Fedor, Chachere, and Pondy (1989a) provided a conceptual integration of myth systems and politics as a way to better appreciate the richness of intraorganizational contexts. The principal examples used in their analysis were drawn from the design and implementation of a performance evaluation system in an organization and the political issues brought to light. It has been found that performance evaluation and promotion systems (theoretically linked) frequently are quite political in nature (Longenecker, 1989; Longenecker, Sims, & Gioia, 1987; Riley, 1983), as was the case in the Ferris et al. study. As was found in the course of this intervention, much of what occurred in the performance evaluation had little to do with the pure accuracy of the appraisal (Kennedy, 1980).

Performance evaluation systems in organizations typically incorporate subjective assessments by superiors of subordinate performance. This subjectivity makes such systems subject to distortion through active efforts of either subordinate or superior (or both) to manage the meaning of performance. A number of investigations have examined the nature and effectiveness of particular political influence behaviors on performance evaluation decisions, with most studying the influence behavior of subordinates toward superiors.

Several studies have found a relationship between political influence tactics of subordinates and performance evaluations. Greenberg (in press) suggested that employees inflate performance evaluations and use them as a self-serving strategy, and Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) reported that supervisor ratings of subordinate performance are affected differentially by the type of influence tactic subordinates employ. Ferris, Judge, Rowland, and Fitzgibbons (1991) and Wayne and Ferris (1990) added to these findings by demonstrating that supervisor-focused influence tactics (e.g., ingratiation) led to subordinates receiving higher performance ratings, but job-focused tactics (e.g., self-promotion) led to lower ratings. Wayne and Kacmar (1991) conducted a laboratory experiment to test the effects of subordinate political influence tactics on both supervisor ratings of subordinate performance and supervisor verbal communication in performance appraisal interviews. Their results supported the favorable effects of influence tactics on both outcomes.

Earlier, Kipnis and Vanderveer (1971) found that a subordinate who engaged in ingratiation received highly positive performance ratings. Contrary to these findings, Fodor (1973a, 1973b, 1974) found that an ingratiator did not receive higher performance ratings in comparison to a noningratiator. In an attempt to explain these contradictory findings, Fodor acknowledged that the ingratiating messages he used were perhaps overly or blatantly ingratiating. This explanation makes sense in light of the notion that as long as intent is disguised or made to appear positive, influence attempts may be effective. However, if the target interprets the attempt as a conscious effort to manipulate, they likely will react negatively. Thus, as argued by Baron (1986, 1989), political influence attempts can backfire if taken to an extreme.

Several studies have examined goal setting as a potential political influence tactic and demonstrated some interesting results. Dossett and Greenberg (1981) found that supervisors gave higher performance ratings to workers who set higher goals than to those who set lower goals, regardless of their actual performance.
One might suggest, in light of these notions, that employees might use the goal-setting process proactively to manage the supervisors' impression that they are ambitious, hard workers, and so forth. Ferris and Porac (1984) tested the notion that the presence of an evaluative observer influences how workers set task goals. They found support for the dual contention that although self-set goals are inflated in the presence of an evaluative observer, such inflation was not associated with an increase in subsequent performance. So, it seems goal setting, (i.e., self-set goals) can be a mechanism for subordinates to nonverbally communicate information to, and thus manage impressions of, supervisors.

Besides communicating high effort, ambition, and so forth, as the Ferris and Porac (1984) study implied, Greenberg (1985) examined goal setting as a self-handicapping strategy. The choice of an extremely difficult performance goal allowed individuals to externalize outcomes that might otherwise have threatened their self-images, and provided a readily available excuse for poor performance. Tedeschi and Melburg's (1984) taxonomy of political influence behaviors includes self-handicapping, classifying it into the tactical-defensive category.

More extensive work needs to be conducted to examine the notion that goals can be set publicly for reasons other than self-direction. Recently, Huber, Latham, and Locke (1989) have further examined the role of political influence in goal setting, but much more theoretical and empirical research is needed.

Performance evaluation: Fit and affect. Similar to the area of personnel selection, there are believed to be intervening variables that mediate the effects of political influence behaviors on performance evaluation decisions. Two of these, which are presented in Figure 1, are assessments of fit and affect or liking, and some recent research has examined these in the context of performance evaluation.

Because the evaluation of performance in many jobs is not amenable to objective assessment and quantification, we find that subjective performance ratings by superiors typically incorporate a variety of nonperformance factors, thus leading to a violation of the most sacred principle of performance evaluation: that we are evaluating performance, not the person in the abstract. The violation of this fundamental principle suggests that factors such as liking, perceived similarity in values, beliefs, and attitudes, and fit may well explain much of the content of performance ratings in organizations. Ferris, Judge, Rowland, and Fitzgibbons (1991) and Wayne and Ferris (1990), for example, found that political influence tactics of subordinates contributed to increased liking by the supervisor, which led the supervisor to rate the subordinate's job performance more favorably. Graen (1989) suggested that perhaps the most important characteristic bosses look for in subordinates, which leads to these subordinates being evaluated more positively and achieving in-group status, is the extent to which the subordinates think like the boss, make similar decisions, and support the boss on matters of importance to him or her. Furthermore, attitudinal similarity was found by Ross and Ferris (1981) to be associated with higher performance evaluations. These all appear to be characteristics or behaviors that are easily manipulated.

Indeed, though some research on interpersonal similarity and performance ratings has been conducted, Wexley and Klimoski (1984) have suggested that much
more attention needs to be devoted to the similarity notion in the performance evaluation process. What does seem reasonably clear at this point is that the type of similarity index employed produces different results. For example, actual similarity of attitudes and values between supervisors and subordinates (i.e., the direct comparison of each party's perspective) has resulted in higher supervisor evaluations of subordinate performance in some research (Miles, 1964; Senger, 1971). However, actual similarity of demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race) has yielded mixed results (Hammer, Kim, Baird, & Bigoness, 1974; Mobley, 1982; Schmitt & Lappin, 1980; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989; Turban & Jones, 1988; Wexley & Pulakos, 1983). In addition, perceived similarity has generally been found to be associated with higher subordinate performance evaluations by superiors and to be a more effective predictor than actual similarity (Pulakos & Wexley, 1983; Turban & Jones, 1988; Wexley, Alexander, Greenawalt, & Couch, 1980). These results appear to make sense in consideration of the potential role of political influence to manage the meaning of similarity. First, it is easier to manage similarity of values than demographic characteristics. And second, people react on the basis of perceptions of reality, not reality per se. Thus, superiors and subordinates may hold quite similar (actual similarity) attitudes or values, but not know it. In this situation, similarity would not be expected to affect reactions or behavior. However, the perception of similarity might.

Performance evaluation: Supervisor behavior. The foregoing discussion has provided evidence in support of the effectiveness of subordinate political influence tactics on supervisor ratings of subordinate performance, and clearly further research is needed in this area to more precisely delineate the differential effectiveness of a broad array of influence attempts. In addition, however, it is important to note that political influence can generate from the supervisor as well as the subordinate in the performance evaluation process. Research has shown that superiors may approach the performance evaluation process with a personal agenda and assign performance ratings not on the basis of "real" performance, but rather as a way to maximize their own self-interests (e.g., Ferris, Judge, Chachere, & Liden, in press; Ferris & King, in press; Longenecker, 1989; Longenecker et al., 1987; Martocchio & Ferris, 1991; Villanova & Bernardin, 1989). Much more research is needed in this area to expand upon existing findings and extend our understanding of the political rater as well as the political ratee. Related to this, Greenberg (1988, 1990) has argued that actual fairness or justice is of much less concern to managers than insuring that they manage the impression or image of fairness.

Performance evaluation: Sources. Another area of performance evaluation systems where meanings and the interpretation of outcomes can be manipulated concerns the sources of evaluation and the increased use of subordinate self-evaluations used in conjunction with supervisor evaluations of the subordinate's performance. The primary focus of both research and practice on self-evaluation has concentrated on the extent to which employees are accurate self-assessors (Ashford, 1989). A basic assumption about self-evaluation, which has probably slowed progress in this area, has been that if employees are allowed to evaluate themselves, they will inflate their ratings. In fact, existing research has shown
some tendency, on the part of subordinates, to rate themselves lower (not higher) than their supervisors rate them. Such findings can be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation is that when subordinates are given this responsibility, they take it seriously and carry it out conscientiously in an effort to provide the most accurate evaluation possible.

An alternative interpretation is that subordinates use the self-evaluations as an impression management strategy to create a particular impression of themselves for the supervisor. In fact, Teel (1978) argued that subordinates may consciously rate their performance lower in order to gain the praise of the supervisor. Subordinates who convey the impression of being unduly self-critical likely find this strategy to be more effective and instrumental in achieving positive evaluations from the supervisor than employing a strategy of inflated ratings. We would likely impute the characteristic of humility to the former and egoism to the latter, and we are socialized to react more favorably to a humble person than an arrogant one.

**Performance evaluation:** Supervisor-subordinate interactions and feedback.

The quality of the supervisor-subordinate working relationship has been a topic of considerable interest to researchers over the years, but recently it has been examined relative to the role of political influence (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Liden & Mitchell, 1989). A couple of empirical studies have reported evidence in support of the role of political influence in such contexts. Ansari and Kapoor (1987) found that student subjects (playing the role of subordinates) reported a willingness and likelihood of using ingratiation tactics directed at their supervisor in order to obtain personal benefits such as career advancement. Also, Wayne and Ferris (1990) found that political influence tactics and performance level affected supervisor-subordinate exchange quality through effects on liking and performance ratings.

It is indeed an incomplete analysis of the performance evaluation process that fails to acknowledge the role of feedback. In a recent conceptualization, Fedor (1991) noted that political influence is now generally recognized as an important element in the feedback process. Recent work by several researchers in this area has suggested the various ways political influence dynamics play out in the feedback process (Ashford & Tsui, 1989; Eder & Fedor, 1989; Quinn & Farr, 1989; Wolfe, 1989). Because the situation in which feedback is received can generate considerable uncertainty and anxiety, Fedor (1991) noted that it is ripe for political influence efforts to emerge. Eder and Fedor (1989) have suggested that feedback recipients are likely to formulate strategies that are designed to influence the attributions made by the source (i.e., supervisor) for good or poor performance: these same strategies (i.e., tactical-defensive political influence behaviors, according to the Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984, taxonomy) were found by Wood and Mitchell (1981) to be used by subordinates in managing the meaning of poor performance.

Clearly, more research is needed to investigate how political influence behaviors are employed in the feedback process. A neglected issue, and one worthy of more precise theoretical and empirical development, concerns the potential ways that supervisors might use feedback as a political influence tactic to maximize their own self-interest. That is, one typically assumes that a supervisor provides
feedback to a subordinate in order to be helpful or assist in bringing about some change in behavior. This, of course, further assumes that the subordinate is the intended target of this effort. It might well be the case that, in such instances, supervisors are “playing to a different audience”; opportunistically, they might be simply “going through the motions” in publicly exhibiting good supervisory behavior that will win them favor with their superiors.

**Promotion and mobility.** Related to performance evaluation activities are the processes involved in intraorganizational mobility; that is, promotions, advancement, and career progress within organizations. In this area, as well, some research has investigated the role of political influence. A number of authors have concluded that promotion systems in organizations can be quite political (e.g., Dyke, 1990; Ferris & Buckley, 1990; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989; Ferris, King, Judge, & Kacmar, 1991; Markham, Harlan, & Hackett, 1987; Riley, 1983), and in the area of management succession, considerable anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that the succession process and decisions are highly political in nature (e.g., Brady & Helreich, 1984; Rowan, 1983; Vance, 1983).

Alternatives to career success, leading to mobility, seem to exist and involve strategies that may be viewed as more political or image-focused than substantive or performance-focused. For example, visibility and exposure (Jennings, 1971), networking (Gould & Penley, 1984), and image building (Heissler & Gimmill, 1978; Larwood & Gattiker, 1983) have been found to bring success in careers. However, Greenhaus (1987) has suggested that career strategies may be differentially effective as a function of a number of factors, such as the norms and practices of the particular organization (Van Maanen, 1980), the nature of the industry (Larwood & Gattiker, 1983), and the type of job or occupation (Gould & Penley, 1984). Beehr, Taber, and Walsh (1980) investigated employee perceptions of organizational mobility and found that political influence in the form of favoritism was viewed as a prominent mobility channel.

Research directly relating influence behavior to career success is sorely needed. Further research also should examine whether influence behavior leads to career progression (including pay increases and salary level, see the following section), or whether those at higher career stages simply are more likely to use influence tactics. Simple correlational analyses, without causal tests, cannot answer this question. A causal analysis of this question, as well as other “chicken and the egg” issues in influence research, is clearly needed.

In summary, it appears that the intentional management of shared meaning can be played out quite effectively in organizations through the personnel selection, performance evaluation, and intraorganizational mobility processes. The ambiguous work environmental context regarding both requisite selection criteria and performance indicators provides substantial opportunity for the management of impressions and shared meaning by organizational actors. But these performances rely upon a basic principle of social behavior for their effective execution. That principle is that similarity (perceived or actual) leads to attraction. Byrne (1969) suggested that agreement or perceived similarity leads to attraction because it increases one’s confidence that his or her opinions or beliefs are correct. Furthermore, as noted by Nemeth and Staw (1989), ambiguity contributes to uni-
formity or consensus in beliefs because individuals actively seek consensus in their opinions of ambiguous events. Active efforts to facilitate and perpetuate homogeneity in beliefs and values can be observed through the internal staffing and promotion systems in many organizations, according to Kanter (1977). She coined the term “homsocial reproduction” as an apt characterization of promotion systems in which decision makers (who are typically middle and top managers) favorably evaluate and promote people just like themselves (in terms of values, beliefs, etc.). The evaluation and mobility systems, according to March (1984), then become essentially filters that screen people on the basis of similar attributes, thus serving to reduce variation and increase homogeneity among managers in the firm. The interesting point, from the standpoint of political influence in P/HRM decisions, is that such evaluations of fit and similarity are highly subjective and can involve a managed meaning process.

Compensation. A couple of recent conceptual pieces reviewing two important areas of compensation systems and decisions, merit pay and pay satisfaction, emphasize the role that political influence might play in compensation research. Miceli and Lane (1991), in reviewing the antecedents of pay satisfaction, indicated that some employees receive higher pay for reasons other than merit, seniority, and so forth. One of the reasons the authors identified was political behavior. Some employees may believe the avenue to higher pay is paved with influence behavior. In the same manner that individuals manage impressions to enhance their performance rating (ingratiation, looking busy, etc.), they may also use influence tactics to obtain higher merit raises. The authors further argued that political behavior may lead to lower pay satisfaction, particularly for those who do not receive rewards for political behavior.

Heneman (1990), in his review of the determinants of merit pay, also reinforced the potential importance of political behavior in compensation. He noted that the relationship between human capital characteristics and merit pay is low. Heneman contended that this relationship might be higher when recipients emphasize the salience and importance of the characteristics to the allocation decision. This is an interesting possibility. In effect, Heneman was suggesting an interaction between human capital and impression management. If the individual has low human capital, impression management will not matter (“you can’t sew a silk purse out of a sow’s ear”). On the other hand, for those with high human capital, their superior characteristics and accomplishments may go unnoticed unless they make efforts to point them out to their superiors.

Although the above authors have laid out a conceptual basis for impression management in compensation, some empirical work provides evidence regarding the role of political influence in compensation decisions and outcomes. Dreher, Dougherty, and Whitely (1988) found that upward influence tactics explained a significant amount of the variance in salaries for both men and women, although the effectiveness of specific tactics varied by gender. For men, bargaining tactics resulted in higher salaries. For women, use of reason and logic led to higher salaries, but use of bargaining tactics led to lower salaries.

Gould and Penley (1984) also found that political influence behavior was significantly related to salary progression (although no gender differences were in-
vestigated). Specifically, the authors found that opinion conformity and other enhancements related to salary progression. Also, Bartol and Martin (1990) found that political connections were instrumental in achieving higher pay raises, but only when the subordinate made a dependency threat.

Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) found that differences in the political orientation of individuals related to the salaries they received. "Shotgun" subordinates (emphasizing assertiveness and bargaining) earned significantly less than "tactician" subordinates (average amount of influence use and emphasizing reason). Freedman (1978), on the other hand, found that strength of the demand for a raise led to higher raises. These two findings might be reconciled in that "shotguns" do not know when to stop being assertive — being overly assertive may be illustrative of Baron's (1989) "too much of a good thing" effect. Freedman's study was only concerned with merit pay decisions. If the people who strongly demanded raises demanded everything else as well (as "shotguns" would do), it could be that their supervisor becomes disgusted and allocates less to them. This subject creates an interesting possibility for future research.

The above studies suggest a strong relationship between compensation decisions and outcomes and political influence, but several studies suggest the contrary. Ross and Ferris (1981) found that attitude similarity between employee and supervisor did not significantly predict salary. The authors' findings could be explained by the possibility that self-report attitudes of subordinates may not match with what the supervisor thinks an employee believes. Further, those that manage impressions are unlikely to let the supervisor know what they really think if they believe their supervisor disagrees. This possibility makes quite crucial the authors' failing to measure supervisor's knowledge of (or lack thereof) subordinate beliefs. Martin (1987) found that influence attempts were not significantly better than no action in obtaining pay raises, although an inequity complaint was significantly more successful than ingratiating behaviors.

Several studies have investigated political influence on reward decisions from the perspective of the allocator. Ferris, Ross, and Fandt (1989) suggested that allocators may grant high ratings and large merit increases to recipients in order to convey the impression to the allocator's superiors that the allocators have done an effective job of managing the recipients. Confirming the contention of Ferris et al., Bartol and Martin (1988) found that self-interests of reward allocators influenced reward allocation decisions. Like Ferris et al., Bartol and Martin contended that reward allocation is used by managers to increase their influence in organizations. Further supporting evidence comes from Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), who found that CEO pay was significantly influenced by the power of the CEO. Although not explicitly relating to the use of influence tactics, it does suggest that the degree of influence of individuals is likely to affect the compensation they draw. Finally, Benson and Hornsby (1988) found that influence tactics were present in job evaluation committees, suggesting that job evaluators may issue ratings based on a political agenda.

P/HRM Decision/Action Outcomes

The major focus of the review to this point has been directed at the nature of
political influence, the conditions under which it is likely to emerge and demonstrate effectiveness, and its effects on important P/HRM decisions and actions. An additional component in Figure 1, however, concerns the outcomes of P/HRM decisions and actions that have involved political influence. A source of difficulty here is to identify research that has investigated consequences of political influence in P/HRM. Most of the research reviewed to this point has focused on the particular P/HRM decision/action as the primary dependent variable. However, there exists a small body of theory and research that has considered a slightly different perspective on political influence. This body of work has focused on perceptions of political influence.

The area of political influence perceptions is a bit different from the foregoing discussion of research because it focuses exclusively on the subjective perception of political influence. Although one would assume that typically there is a strong correspondence between the actual demonstration of political influence behavior and the perception of such behavior, it must be acknowledged that perceptual differences and interpretations of events occur and thus have the potential to create discrepancies between actual political behavior (i.e., a person demonstrating interpersonal behaviors designed to manage shared meaning of some event or characteristic) and an observer’s perception of such behavior. However, the main reason that research on perceptions of political influence is important is that people’s perceptions of events become their reality in a particular situation, and they react on the basis of these perceptions.

Theory and research on perceptions of political influence have been limited to the work of a few over a relatively short period of time. Three empirical studies were published around 1980 (Gandz & Murray, 1980; Jablin, 1981; Madison et al., 1980), and then several theoretical and empirical investigations nearly a decade later (Ferris, Fedor, Chachere, & Pondy, 1989; Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989; Ferris & Kacmar, in press; Ferris, Gilmore, & Kacmar, 1990; Kacmar & Ferris, 1991; Wayne, Kacmar, & Ferris, 1989). The early investigations by Gandz and Murray and Madison et al. identified a number of individual and organizational predictors of political influence perceptions, which were interesting in their own right, but are not as relevant for the present discussion of P/HRM. Jablin’s (1981) study perhaps has greater implicit relevance because it focused on the political influence behavior of the supervisor and subordinate reaction to such behavior. He found that subordinates who perceived their supervisors as highly involved in political influence were less satisfied with their supervisors and less open in communication with them than subordinates who perceived only moderate or minimal involvement.

More recent research on political influence perceptions has both attempted to develop theory and demonstrate the implications for P/HRM issues. Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) proposed a conceptual model of political influence perceptions that specified both antecedents and consequences. Following from prior work, individual and organizational factors were proposed as predictors of political influence perceptions, but in addition, supervisor and co-worker behaviors were included. Some of the supervisor and co-worker behaviors, in scale development efforts, have taken the form of actions played out in P/HRM areas (e.g., staffing,
performance evaluation). Empirical data have demonstrated significant negative relationships of both supervisor and co-worker political influence behavior (which both have emerged as independent dimensions in factor analyses; Ferris & Kacmar, in press) with employee job satisfaction.

Additional research on consequences of political influence perceptions provided some support for the moderating influences proposed in the Ferris, Russ, and Fandt, 1989 model. Consistent with predictions, both understanding of politics (Ferris et al., 1990) and perceived control over politics (Ferris, Brand, Brand, Rowland, Gilmore, Kacmar, & Burton, 1991) have been found to moderate the political influence perceptions — outcomes relationships. More specifically, increased understanding was associated with reduced anxiety reactions to political influence, whereas reduced understanding led to a positive relationship between politics perceptions and anxiety. With respect to control, results demonstrated that more negative attitudinal outcomes were associated with perceptions of political influence under conditions of low perceived control. Outcomes related to politics perceptions were less negative under conditions of greater control.

One recent investigation examined how the demonstration of political influence behavior toward a supervisor might affect bystanders. Wayne et al. (1989) conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate how subordinate political influence behavior directed toward a supervisor affected co-worker perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. Interestingly, the ingratiation efforts of the subordinate (directed toward the supervisor) affected coworkers favorably, not unfavorably as one might expect, leading to increased satisfaction. Although these results might appear counterintuitive, they make more sense upon closer examination. As Wayne et al. pointed out, observing a subordinate exhibiting influence tactics toward a supervisor may well be construed as manipulative by onlookers, but the term manipulative has two quite different definitions as mentioned by Owen (1986). Using Webster's dictionary, he presented the following two definitions of manipulate: (1) “manage or utilize skillfully”; (2) “control or play upon as artful, unfair, or insidious means.” Thus, it appears that one might react positively or negatively depending on which definition they employ. Furthermore, the triggering mechanism that might determine which definition of manipulation one adopts might be the particular type of influence tactics employed by the actor.

All political behaviors are neither equally effective nor similarly perceived. It has been found that ingratiation types of political behaviors tend to be positively associated with performance ratings given by supervisors (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1991; Kipnis & Vanderveer, 1971), likely operating on such outcomes through their effects on affect or liking. Other types of political behaviors that emphasize entitlements (i.e., claiming responsibility for positive events) can be risky because the manipulator may be perceived as egotistical, thus leading to a negative impression and negative affect (Tedeschi & Melburg, 1984). In fact, such tactics have been found to be inversely related to performance ratings (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1991; Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Wayne & Kacmar, 1991).
Theory and Research Limitations and Needs

The review and analysis of political influence behavior effects at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis has suggested some useful contributions to our understanding of P/HRM decisions. However, both theoretical and empirical developments are seriously needed, some of which are noted more specifically in this section of the paper.

Political influence behaviors and effects. Research in this area has investigated a relatively limited number of influence behaviors in consideration of taxonomies proposed by Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), for example. Most investigations have focused on ingratiating, some have examined self-promotion behaviors, and others have confounded the two. Gilmore and Ferris (1989a) examined the effects of applicant political influence behavior and competence on interviewer evaluations of applicant suitability for a customer service representative position in a large public utility. In the development of the videotaped political influence manipulation, it appears that aspects of ingratiating and self-promotion were employed, thus creating a potential confound of tactics. Whereas the results demonstrated effects for political influence, the relative weakness of these effects might have been due to the confounding of ingratiating and self-promotion that have been demonstrated to be quite distinct tactics (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986). Whereas ingratiating is argued to lead to attributions of likability, self-promotion is suggested to operate through attributions of competence.

It seems, then, that political influence research needs to concentrate on several issues. One is to sort out the differential effectiveness of particular forms of political influence in different P/HRM decision contexts through competitive tests. Some initial steps have been taken to address this point, demonstrating that whereas ingratiating is more effective than self-promotion in raising performance evaluations (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1991; Wayne & Ferris, 1990), the opposite pattern of results was found for selection interviewer evaluations in the employment interview. However, more research is needed to better establish the effectiveness of different tactics in different P/HRM contexts. In conjunction with this, we would suggest a broader examination of different types of political influence behaviors beyond ingratiating and self-promotion. Considerably deficient, for example, is our understanding of political influence behaviors that occupy Tedeschi and Melburg's (1984) strategic-assertive quadrant. Many of these behaviors, such as prestige, status, credibility, and, we would add, reputation, would seem to be quite critical in career progress over time. Indeed, this additionally suggests the need for more longitudinal research in order to more fully understand these issues.

Another area in need of research is how effective are political behaviors on personnel selection decisions when prior information is available. Research by Dipboye (1989) has demonstrated that pre-interview impressions affect interviewer decisions. The question that comes to mind is whether political influence behaviors are so influential on selection decisions that they overpower the effects of pre-interview information and impressions or whether political influence tactics are neutralized when pre-interview impression are formed.

Yet another area of research that needs to be pursued is to better understand
rater/evaluator cognitive processes under conditions of political influence attempts. The processes of liking and competence attributions have been proposed to mediate between political influence behaviors and decision-maker evaluations; however, only liking has been investigated in recent causal modeling of the performance evaluation process (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1991; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). We need to pursue a much more complete understanding of precisely how different types of political influence behaviors operate on evaluators to explain observed effects of P/HRM decisions.

Finally, research on political influence in personnel selection needs to move beyond the employment interview to investigate other selection devices. For example, Knouse (1989) has discussed the role of political influence in letters of recommendation. In addition, we might suggest the investigation of political influence behaviors and their effects in the assessment center.

Decision context and the decision maker: Political influence behavior and its effects on P/HRM decisions needs to consider more broadly the decision context, including the decision maker’s situation. Key aspects of the decision-making process need to be investigated that will affect the extent to which political behavior will influence decisions. Some of these aspects are the specification of decision criteria (or lack thereof), the weighting of criteria, and the time frame of the decision. Furthermore, there are decision-maker factors that need to be examined in future research on political influence behavior. One set of factors was proposed by Gilmore and Ferris (1989a) and involves the overall extent to which the decision maker is prepared for the decision task. Their discussion was specific to employment interview decisions and included factors such as the amount of experience as an interviewer, the amount of interviewer training, and the amount and quality of information that decision makers have about the job for which they are selecting people. All of these factors are believed to affect the degree of ambiguity in the decision context and perhaps also the extent to which the decision maker is susceptible to political influence attempts. Although it is more comforting to assume that these variables are constants, in fact, it is quite reasonable to expect considerable variability.

Other factors about the decision maker that need further investigation are his or her degree of accountability and personal agenda. It is believed that the extent to which the decision makers are held accountable or have to answer to someone for their decisions, with potential consequences, will affect how they conduct the decision task. Whereas we might find variability in decision accountability across types of P/HRM decisions (e.g., selection performance evaluation, etc.), we should also encounter accountability variance within decision types.

Finally, an area that has been only considered in a quite limited manner to date is the personal agenda with which the decision maker approaches the decision task. Traditionally, the assumption is made in research on P/HRM decisions that the decision maker’s intention is to select the candidate that best matches the job demands, render the most accurate evaluation of an employee’s performance, and so forth. We must recognize, however, that sometimes the decision maker has other intentions in P/HRM decision making that render “accuracy” an irrelevant criterion, and perhaps reinterprets what “the best candidate” means. As noted in
the review and analysis of research, the actor or initiator in political influence attempts can be either the job applicant/employee or the decision maker. The decision maker might approach the personnel selection task with the self-serving motive of hiring someone who expresses the same attitudes, beliefs, and values as he or she does, as an effort to build or add to one’s power base through coalition building. Thus, a fuller consideration needs to be made of the personal agenda or intentions of the decision maker in P/HRM decisions.

Candidate characteristics and “fit”. Political influence research has investigated a number of demographic and personality characteristics of candidates/actors in the influence process. In conjunction with a consideration of candidate characteristics and behaviors, which need more extensive investigation, systematic efforts are needed to sort out the rather illusive notion of “fit.” Indeed, the determination of fit is made by the decision maker, and it is likely based upon perceived or actual similarity of the candidate to some standard or reference point. This standard base of comparison is not completely clear, but probably can involve a variety of factors from personal characteristics of the decision maker to the values and/or culture of the organization. The inherent subjectivity involved in the determination of fit suggests that this construct could be quite amenable to managed meaning, and candidates might actively attempt to exercise influence over the subjective assessment of fit by the decision maker. What is needed are efforts to investigate precisely how candidates go about managing the perception of fit.

One area of investigation that might be pursued is the role that beliefs and values of candidates play in the determination of fit. Chatman (1989) has discussed how the values of workers must be congruent with organizational values, and some empirical research has demonstrated the effects of value congruity (particularly perceived congruity as opposed to actual congruity) on outcomes such as power and performance evaluations (e.g., Enz, 1988; Senger, 1971). Ferris, King, Judge, and Kacmar (1991) have discussed the opportunistic reflection of beliefs and values in an effort to better understand the active management of fit.

Another potentially productive research direction in this area of fit is to consider how information is signaled to P/HRM decision makers in the employment setting. P/HRM decision makers are in the position of assessing the extent to which candidates possess attributes and qualities that are not necessarily observable (e.g., ability, reputation, etc.). In this light, market signaling theory from economics can be useful in better understanding these dynamics: “Market signals are activities or attributes of individuals in a market which, by design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market (Spence, 1974: 1). Although much of the analysis of this theory discusses human capital variables as market signals, it also allows for a variety of behaviors in which one might engage to send signals of ability, reputation, and perhaps, fit. Indeed, Kanter and Brinkerhoff (1981) concluded that reputational effectiveness is more of a political than scientific construct. Furthermore, whereas Spence tends to characterize signals in a passive sense (i.e., one has them or not), the theory does not disallow the active manipulation of signals for meaning management purposes. Market signaling theory appears particularly relevant to personnel se-
lection decisions, but to advancement over time as well. Somewhat related to these notions of signals and their impact on P/HRM decisions is Rosenbaum’s (1989) concept of “tournament mobility.”

Rosenbaum (1989) has suggested that intraorganizational mobility and associated P/HRM decisions can be best understood in terms of tournament competition. A tournament is a system for identifying the most qualified person by observing his or her success in a series of increasingly selective competitions. Decisions are made at each stage of competition in the tournament, with winners progressing to the next stage of competition. Losers, presumably, are labeled or stigmatized, and if they are allowed to compete in any further competitions, it is at a different level (i.e., a loser’s bracket) with reduced status and rewards. Furthermore, the winner of competitions likely receives increased resources from the organization in the form of supervisor attention, training and development, and so forth.

The tournament concept is an appealing one indeed, and is potentially useful for the field of P/HRM and decision-maker evaluations of candidates. However, we would suggest some additions to this concept in the way political influence and resulting decision-maker behavior might affect the tournament process in a way not fully captured by the theory. The theory, as articulated by Rosenbaum (1989), seems to imply some degree of objectivity and unbiased assessment in the declaration of competition winners. In fact, due to the ambiguity surrounding performance criteria on many jobs and other characteristics of the situation, such decisions are highly subjective and susceptible to active political influence efforts of candidates. Also, theoretically, there is only really one important competition: the initial one. If the candidate is successful in the first competition and declared a winner, the person is labeled, impressions are set, and the behavior of decision makers in the organization is influenced by these impressions to provide more resources to these “winners.” Such self-fulfilling prophecies might provide a reasonable explanation for successes in future competitions; the deck is stacked in favor of the initial winner. For our purposes in this article, it is important to recognize that managers who are involved in personnel selection decisions are not infrequently the very individuals who supervise the newly entering employees and render evaluations of their performance. Furthermore, as such managers progress upward through the organizational ranks, they may well ensure concomitant mobility of those subordinates who they believe are effective and/or fit well with their own style. Although such evaluations are made by the decision maker, they can be influenced by the subordinate.

Another aspect of the tournament model concerns the past attainments and career velocity factors of candidates who are believed to influence progress over time (Rosenbaum, 1989). Particularly the career velocity (i.e., positions one has attained relative to their age or tenure) notion seems to be affected by the “fast track” nature of some organizational mobility systems, which we would argue can complicate the accuracy of effectiveness evaluations by confounding substance with form (Ferris & King, in press).

Clearly, the very essence of performance evaluation systems, which serve as the basis for many important P/HRM decisions, necessitates and assumes that
work performance is an objective reality that can be accurately observed and evaluated. Even assuming such a fixed target, the predictive validities obtained using various instruments and measures to predict work performance tend not to be overly impressive. The foregoing discussion suggests, instead of a fixed target and objective reality, that performance becomes a moving target and a socially constructed reality. Thus, efforts need to be made to better define the nature of job performance for a variety of different jobs in which objective, quantifiable criteria are not available. Compounding this problem of performance measurement is the rapid movement or fast track philosophies of many organizations. A fast track system involving quick movement potentially encourages at least as much symbolic behavior (perhaps political in nature) as actual effective performance. Because one is in a particular job or position a reasonably short period of time, and because standards of performance on such jobs are ambiguous at best, individuals are likely to be evaluated more on how much it appears that they are contributing than on the basis of their actual (objective) performance level (Pfeffer, 1981a).

Thompson, Kirkham, and Dixon (1985) also have discussed the potentially dysfunctional consequences of a fast track system. They argued that such a system forces managers to focus on engaging in highly visible activities that produce dramatic results in the shortest possible time frame. It seems that rapid movement through a series of jobs does not permit enough time in grade to develop one’s skills and competencies to the fullest, thus raising serious questions concerning the long-term contributions being made by people in such a system. Furthermore, because the very nature of the system seems to encourage perhaps more symbolic and political behavior than substantive contribution, the performance construct will likely remain obscure and open to manipulation and distortion.

Other conceptual and methodological issues. Further refinements need to be made in the nature of the perceptions of political influence construct. Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) argued that whether politics perceptions lead to negative or positive outcomes is a function of whether they are perceived as a threat (i.e., to fear and be intimidated by) or as an opportunity on which to capitalize. Essentially, this perspective would suggest that individuals cognitively evaluate such situations in terms of whether the particular work environmental features or activities (i.e., in this case, politics) are personally detrimental or personally beneficial, and subsequent affect and behavior follow from that initial cognitive evaluation. This is precisely the point that James and James (1989) made recently in their analysis of work environment perceptions. These notions have not been directly tested to date and thus need to be considered in future research.

A number of methodological problems need to be considered and addressed as well in future research investigating political influence in P/HRM. One is the potential social desirability bias inherent in research on “sensitive topics.” That is, positivity response bias is likely to result when research participants are asked questions regarding the extent to which they engage in political behaviors; primarily because most people perceive “politics” in the pejorative sense. Alternative, or multiple, sources should be considered. Judge (1990), for example, used “significant other” evaluations in tandem with self-report evaluations of the focal
employee’s disposition. Such an approach might be well suited for research on political influence individual differences and behaviors as well.

A second problem concerns the nearly exclusive use of cross-sectional research designs in this area. Yet, it appears that we can best understand how political influence affects promotions, intraorganizational mobility, and career advancement as longitudinal research designs are used to investigate how these behaviors and decisions unfold over time.

A methodological issue of considerable importance for our understanding of the political influence perspective is level of analysis. Theory and research in this section examined political influence at the individual and dyadic levels of analysis, which is necessary and important, but not sufficient to fully understand this perspective or evaluate its usefulness. The interpersonal dynamics of political influence take place within a context that is shaped by competing interests and influences taking place at group and organization levels of analysis. To neglect these levels would render this review and analysis necessarily deficient and the political influence perspective incomplete.

Broadening the Context: Political Influence in P/HRM at the Group and Organization Level of Analysis

We have characterized political influence as the management of shared meaning and witnessed how this process operates in interpersonal interactions in organizations. In this section, we suggest that the management of shared meaning takes place at the group and organization levels among competing interests that influence, and indeed form, the P/HRM arena within which individual and dyadic political influence is played out. In fact, Kanter and Brinkerhoff (1981) have characterized organizations as “battlegrounds” where various internal and external stakeholders (who possess different interests) compete to influence critical decision criteria in a way that furthers their own interests. Many of these critical decision areas involve P/HRM systems.

Pfeffer (1989) has applied a political influence perspective to the examination of several key P/HRM areas at the group and organization levels of analysis. His analysis includes political influence in staffing, mobility, and compensation, and explicitly stated is the need to understand the competing interests of key constituencies. Pfeffer’s analysis and related work are drawn upon in this section to broaden the context of political influence in P/HRM systems and decisions.

Staffing

Pfeffer (1989) has examined staffing and hiring practices in organizations from an interesting, and decidedly different, perspective. Traditional research approaches to staffing practices would investigate the effects of particular practices on some outcomes of interest, with staffing practices positioned as the independent or predictor variables. Pfeffer has proposed that hiring standards should be considered with respect to how they emerge, thus viewing them as dependent variables, and he has conducted some empirical research to examine this notion systematically (Cohen & Pfeffer, 1986). He views hiring standards as the outcome of competition among competing interests, each attempting to control the...
types of people brought into the organization to further their own interests. The issues of similarity and "fit" presented in an earlier section on political influence in personnel selection can be more completely understood as we see how such evaluative standards or comparison bases emerge and, thus, how the rules for staffing get crafted. Coalitions differentiated on the bases of demography, values, and/or beliefs compete for control over the personnel selection system decision criteria. The winning coalition then structures the staffing system such that similarity to the coalition's demography, values, and so forth become the critical selection criteria, which increases the influence of the coalition by enhancing its power base. A manifestation of this process is embodied in the notion of "homosocial reproduction" identified by Kanter (1977).

Performance Evaluation

Whereas, the staffing context provides an interesting forum for the examination of competing interests and political influence over decision criteria, this process is perhaps even more complex with respect to the definition of and control over performance criteria. For example, in her typology of human resource cultures for professionals, Von Glinow (1985) suggested that in cultures characterized by a strong concern for people but weak performance expectations (i.e., "Caring Culture"), performance evaluations tend not to be performance-oriented. Rather, non-performance-related criteria are used, like cooperation, teamwork, and fitting in, and it is quite likely that individuals would be evaluated on the basis of effort instead of results. One might argue that the less objective the performance outcomes of a job, the less sensitive are performance evaluation systems in detecting differences in true or actual work performance. Such systems then would tend to focus on the detection of differences in perceived performance, which can be influenced by symbolic (or political) behavior/performance. It is not surprising that in such situations, people are frequently evaluated on the basis of work effort or attitude (Pfeffer, 1981a).

As noted earlier, the ambiguous nature of work performance as one moves upward in the organization's hierarchy provides the opportunity for the management of meaning to be effective. As Nemeth and Staw (1989) noted, where performance evaluation and promotion criteria are vague and ambiguous, surrogate criteria emerge in the form of conformity to organization norms and the particular tastes and preferences of one's supervisor. Thus, according to Nemeth and Staw, those seeking favorable performance reviews and upward advancement in such ambiguous circumstances can be expected to monitor their environments carefully and attend to any salient cues regarding supervisor expectations, preferences, and social approval. Ferris, Russ, and Fandt (1989) suggested that when performance outcomes are less easily measured objectively, we tend to focus on employees' behavior rather than their actual results. Pfeffer (1981a) even argued that in such ambiguous situations, we tend to evaluate people on the basis of beliefs, values, and effort. The performance evaluation and promotion system, according to March (1984), then becomes essentially a filter that screens people on the basis of similar attributes (i.e., perceived similarity to some stereotype, to ex-
isting managers, or the person making the evaluation), thus serving to reduce variation and increase homogeneity in the firm.

It appears then that particularly when performance criteria are ambiguous and or subjectively evaluated, there is more of an opportunity for political or opportunistic behavior to occur. Halaby (1978) suggested that under conditions of high professionalization, specialization, and functional complexity (i.e., nonroutinized), promotion criteria become much more subjective (perhaps providing more of an opportunity for individual candidates to exercise influence over such decisions through politics). Furthermore, Riley (1983) found evidence of considerably more political behavior in nonroutinized versus routinized task environments, particularly noting promotion systems.

Russ (1990) argued that organizations will use output control when performance criteria are objective and measurable, but will shift to behavior control in performance evaluation when outcome criteria are ambiguous, following from the work of Ouchi (1977), Ouchi and Maguire (1975), and Thompson (1967). But rather than a completely deterministic view of control, some researchers have suggested that managers not only try to enhance others’ impressions of them, but also try to influence the criteria by which others judge them (Kanter & Brinkerhoff, 1981; Russ, 1990). Managers are motivated to protect their managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984). Therefore, knowing that owners’ primary interests are in the financial performance of the firm, but also recognizing that organizational outcomes are affected by many factors other than their own efforts, managers should desire that they be held accountable for performance only to the extent to which performance is under their control. As uncertainty increases and controllability decreases, however, managers will prefer to be evaluated on their behaviors rather than on organizational outcomes. Under conditions of extreme uncertainty (e.g., environmental threats, jolts, or crises), even behavior control becomes undesirable.

Thompson (1967) noted that as goals and appropriate behaviors become more ambiguous or uncertain, preferred measures of firm effectiveness shift to satisfaction of external constituencies. In other words, as conditions become more uncertain, external legitimacy becomes more important. In the highly uncertain environment, Russ argued that managers will prefer a clan form of control, whereby they are evaluated not on their outcomes or behaviors, but on their intentions and values, and that they will attempt to influence external stakeholders’ perceptions of appropriate evaluation criteria through formal organizational communications (e.g., annual reports or press releases). According to King (1991), under conditions of poor performance and/or crises, the reestablishment of legitimacy is an important objective of organizations and is accomplished through active efforts to manage meaning.

The foregoing demonstrates how political influence is exercised over the evaluation criteria used to measure performance. Performance evaluation systems and decisions are also affected by the control of information flows and thus the quantity and quality of performance-related information that is made available for evaluation. Kanter and Brinkerhoff (1981) suggested that some professional associations and unions have exercised influence and gained control over the extent to
which the work of their members is subject to observation. Thus, to the extent that control is gained over the flow of performance information upward in organizations, individuals or groups can insulate themselves from negative evaluations.

The broader context of performance evaluation systems, then, suggests that influence is exercised over the information and decision criteria through the management of meaning by competing interests. The outcome of this process forms the performance evaluation context within which supervisors and subordinates interact to manage the meaning of individual performance. An additional feature of the broader context that influences the performance evaluation process and outcomes relates to the compositional effects of the work group or department. For example, Ferris, Judge, Chachere, and Liden (in press) found that work group age composition interacted with age of supervisor to influence the performance rating patterns of supervisors.

**Advancement and Mobility**

Internal labor markets and opportunity structures have been studied for many years, and from several perspectives. Pfeffer and Cohen (1984), however, suggested that the study of internal labor markets might more profitability direct its focus on power and influence as important determinants. Furthermore, Baron and his associates have demonstrated, through their research in this area, that a political influence perspective is quite applicable (Baron & Bielby, 1986; Baron, Davis-Blake, & Bielby, 1986). In their study of intraorganizational opportunity structure, Baron et al. found that women’s jobs were less likely than men’s jobs to be located in job ladders. Furthermore, they reported that of the jobs located in job ladders, men’s jobs were not as likely as women’s jobs to be dead-ended. Thus, one can see how interests of coalitions based on gender demography can become influential and perpetuate the status quo through control exercised over P/HRM decision criteria.

Baron and Bielby (1986) investigated job title proliferation in organizations and identified the effects of competing interest groups. They reported that when unions were present, there were fewer job titles, whereas the presence of a personnel function tended to increase job titles. One explanation they proposed for this outcome was the gender-based categorization of jobs and concomitant wage differences.

Another important aspect of mobility and advancement where the political influence perspectives is relevant at the group and organization levels of analysis is the succession process. More than 25 years ago, Zald (1965) identified the management succession process as a political event. Pfeffer (1989) has examined the succession process relative to competing interests, and he suggests that the outcomes of succession are informational concerning the dominant coalitions or interests that wield the most influence at the time. The dominant interests thus attempt to ensure perpetuation of their control through succession/promotion of individuals supportive of those interests, once again raising the important political influence issues of similarity or fit in P/HRM decisions.
Compensation

Political influence is believed to be prominent in wage and compensation system decisions, again reflecting the power of different interests (Pfeffer, 1989). Moore and Pfeffer (1980), for example, reported that larger faculty salary increases were made in the more powerful departments within the university. Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1987) also investigated departmental power and wages, employing a resource-dependence explanation. They reported that criticality of department tended to be associated positively with wage level.

Compensation systems involve the allocation of scarce resources and, as such, are characterized by political influence in the form of managed meaning among competing interests and coalitions who struggle for control over the decision criteria. Thus, salary increase decisions resulting from interpersonal political influence cannot be completely understood without knowledge of how competing interests influence decision criteria in the broader context.

Summary

This section broadened the context to examine political influence in P/HRM systems and decisions at the group and organization levels of analysis. This system level is important because we can only fully understand political influence in context and, as we demonstrated, there are different levels of context. Contextual considerations are incorporated in the conceptualization of political influence at the individual and dyadic level of analysis presented in Figure 1, as reflected by the Situational Characteristics. Although these characteristics help to portray the context, they do so in a necessarily incomplete manner, constrained by the level of analysis. A broader perspective is needed to appreciate more completely the contextual dynamics that operate at different levels of analysis. Therefore, we would suggest that to develop the most informed understanding of political influence in P/HRM systems and decisions requires a sufficiently broad perspective that incorporates multiple levels of analysis.

The Political Influence Perspective in P/HRM: An Evaluation

A political influence perspective was used to systematically examine several key areas of P/HRM. This perspective was introduced as potentially beneficial to the field in providing a more complete understanding of P/HRM systems and decisions. Whereas the foregoing sections of this article reviewed political influence ideas, issues, and research relevant to P/HRM, in this section we address the "value added" concern in an effort to evaluate the potential contribution and effectiveness of this perspective for the P/HRM field.

Advocates of the political influence perspective have argued that organizations, by their very nature, involve diversity, competing interests, scarcity of resources, and power struggles (Bolman & Deal, 1991). In contrast, a more traditional human resource frame assumes a more "rational model" perspective of organizations, suggesting that individual-organization fit represents a quite attainable objective, accommodating the mutuality of needs and interest, as well as emphasizing the importance of cooperation. We would suggest that these two perspectives could not be further apart in terms of their fundamental assumptions, and thus, as
Bolman and Deal have noted, the very strengths of one perspective represent the limitations of the other. The political perspective underemphasizes rational and collaborative processes, and tends to be viewed as pessimistic and cynical, overestimating conflict of interests. Alternatively, Bolman and Deal have argued that the human resource perspective is criticized for being naive and overly optimistic about the feasibility of effectively integrating individual and organizational needs and interests.

Because these perspectives are so divergent in nature, it would seem problematic to identify common ground or areas of consensus. But let us not forget that the objective of this article was not to attempt an integration of political influence with other perspectives. Thus, the evaluative criterion need not be an unduly rigorous one. The question under consideration is not whether the political influence perspective alone is sufficient to account for the complexities and dynamics of P/HRM systems and decisions. Indeed it cannot. The question is whether the political influence perspective can contribute to our understanding of P/HRM processes in a nontrivial way. It is our opinion that sufficient evidence has been gathered thus far to suggest that it can. However, it is proposed not as a substitute, but as a supplement to other perspectives on P/HRM. Which particular perspective best explains P/HRM decisions under certain conditions is an empirical question.

**Conclusion: Toward a Multi-Perspective Conceptualization of P/HRM**

We began this article by considering the various perspectives that have been applied to the field of P/HRM over the years. It is fair to conclude that most theory and research has been micro-analytic in level of analysis and unitary in perspective, with a rational model human resources perspective dominating the field. To some extent, this trend is a function of the disciplinary background and research training and experience of P/HRM scholars. It is easy to become wedded to a particular perspective that then influences the issues we see as important and the way we perceive them, reminiscent of Kaplan's (1964) little boy who, upon being given a hammer, concluded that, of course, everything needed to be hammered. We are not arguing that further research at the individual level of analysis is inappropriate. In fact, it probably will continue to dominate human resources (and political influence) research — perhaps rightly so. Our belief is that significant progress in our understanding of P/HRM issues will be made not simply through perpetuation of traditional approaches to theory and research, but through the consideration of multiple perspectives, levels of analysis, and research methodologies.

There is reason to be optimistic about the future status of theory and research in P/HRM because we have already witnessed recognition of the need for work done beyond the individual level of analysis. Butler et al. (1991) argued for an organization-level view of P/HRM and cited Heneman (1969) in discussing a "vertical synthesis" of variables across levels. Indeed, several others have suggested that HRM theory and research be placed in a broader perspective (Dyer, 1985; Milkovich, 1988; Schmitt & Schneider, 1983; Wallace, 1983; Zedeck & Cascio, 1984), and empirical investigations at this level are increasing as referenced in this review and elsewhere.
A significant challenge remains for theory and research to model key P/HRM decision processes in ways that allow for the incorporation and competitive testing of multiple perspectives. This presumably would preclude the myopic domination of a single perspective and enrich our understanding of the issues and processes under investigation. In conjunction with a broader consideration of different perspectives in P/HRM, a wider variety of research methodologies might need to be used, effectively matching appropriate methods to the nature of how the research question is framed. For example, P/HRM scholars could profit from the use of different qualitative research methods as demonstrated by Longenecker et al. (1987).

In conclusion, this Yearly Review article considered a political influence perspective on the field of P/HRM, and concluded that it could be a potentially useful supplement (not a substitute) to be investigated in conjunction with other perspectives. Such a multi-perspective conceptualization of P/HRM would also necessarily incorporate different levels of analysis and research methodologies. We believe that significant advances in our understanding of P/HRM systems and decisions will only be made by thinking more broadly about the focal issues and incorporating different views and perspectives in their examination.

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